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FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
TOWARD A NEW EQUALITY
Mary Jane Mossman* and Morag MacLeant

The risingdivorce rate in Canadahashad a differentialeconomic impact uponmen and
women, and the author speculatesready divorce hasbeen a majorcontributingfactorin
the "'feminization of poverty". Principles in family law which have emerged for
determiningeligibilityforsupportupon divorceorseparationarenot consistent with the
principles of social assistance legislation. Future reforms must address the different
economic positions offormer husbands and wives following maritalbreakdown if the
principles of equality and independence espoused as ideal are to apply to everyone.
Le taux croissantde divorce au Canadaa eu une ripercussiondconomique indgaleentre
hommes etfemmes. La 'fiminisationde lapauvret" serait,aprsI'auteur attribuable
en grandepartie h lafaciitidu divorce. Les nouveauxprincipesdu droitfamilial qui
diterminent le droitau soutienfinancierau moment d'un divorceoud'unes6parationne
sont pas en accordavec la ligislationde Paidesociale. Les nouvelles riformesdoivent
prendreen considdrationles situationsiconomiques des ex-mariset dpousesaumoment
de la siparation si ron veut atteindre des principes d'egalitd et d'inddpendence
d'applicationuniverselle.
INTRODUCTION
The spread of a society organized around self-reliance, the market, and wagc
labor marked a great advance, perhaps especially for women, but we should also
mark its costs and limits. By the time our nation reached the early twentieth
century the attempt to shore up independence through economic means had
become largely defensive, and in our own time economic individualism largely
betrays the promise it once held out. Neither the attempt to extend the
traditionally male ideal of individual independence to women nor the attempt to
extend the traditionally female ideal of nurturance to men can be based on an
economic system that fosters a one-sided ideal of economic independence and
correspondingly hollow collectivity. True independence, for both sexes, is based
on an acceptance of our dependence on others and is realized through ourability
to nurture and give to others without conflict within ourselves.'

© Mary Jane Mossman and Morag MacLean
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School
I LL.B. 1985, Osgoode Hall Law School
1. E. Zaretsky, "The Place of the Family in the Origins of the Welfare State" in Barrie
Thorne with Marilyn Yalom, eds., Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions
(New York and London: Longman, 1982) at 218-219.

REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL

[VOL. 5

This paper is an exploration of some underlying themes in family law and
income maintenance. 2 More particularly, the paper attempts to identify the
principles which have emerged in family law for determining entitlement to
support upon divorce or marriage breakdown, and to contrast these with the
principles generally used to determine entitlement to income maintenance. It
seems that family law principles have increasingly characterized support
entitlement as a means of creating equality and independence for former
spouses. By contrast, primary dependence on a spouse, former spouse, or
"spousal equivalent" seems to be the prevailing notion in the income main3
tenance context.
The lack of congruence between these underlying principles in family law
and social assistance legislation is significant for two reasons. First, it results
in two distinct systems of "family law". In family units where there is
sufficient property and other wealth on marriage breakdown to permit each
spouse to have some financial security independently, there will be no
recourse to state support through social assistance. However, in less affluent
families, a division of property may result in each spouse having an inadequate
portion to provide financial security; of course, in very poor families, there
may be no property to divide at all. For these reasons, the principles of
equality and independence now espoused in the family law context may have
practical effect, if at all, only for more well-to-do families; although they may
be applied in the context of less affluent families, their application has no
practical impact.
The criticism that family law principles which address the division of
property and wealth on marriage breakdown have no application to those with
little or no property or wealth might be explained as merely one more example
of the pervasive economic basis of the legal system. 4 However, the second
phenomenon which needs to be explored regarding these principles is their
differential impact on men and women. That there is a differential impact
suggests the need for a different type of analysis. The ideology of equality and
independence evident in the principles of support is essentially that of classic
liberalism,' and it is applied in the family law context as if husbands and wives

2.

This paper develops some ideas earlier explored in "Family Law and Social Welfare in
Canada", a paper by Mary Jane Mossman prepared for the Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, August 1984.

3.

See infra, at 34.

4.

This is, of course, a traditional Marxist analysis. See, for example, F. Engels, The

5.

1972).
See, for example, J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869) (London: Oxford

Origin of the Family,PrivateProperty and the State (New York: International Publishers,
University Press, 1912).
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were similarly situated 6 in marriage, and as if equality and independence after
marriage breakdown presented the same difficulties and the same opportunities for both spouses.' In fact, there seems to be mounting evidence that
the increasing ease of obtaining a divorce is an important factor contributing
to the "feminization of poverty".8 Further, the income maintenance net
extended by the state offers only token support for former wives in need, by
comparison with others who require social assistance for different reasons.9
This paper explores a major social phenomenon of our society: an increasing divorce rate and a new trend towards serial monogamy. In doing so, this
paper questions the appropriateness of existing legal principles in family law
and income maintenance as responses to the economic consequences of such
phenomenon. In addition, this paper focuses upon the apparently different
economic positions of former husbands and former wives following marriage
breakdown, and suggests that any future reform must take into account these
differences to effectively ensure equality for both sexes.
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY:
MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE BREAKDOWN

There is now abundant statistical evidence of the escalating divorce rate in
Canada. 10 In 1982, there were 70,436 divorces granted in Canada (23,644 in
Ontario) for a rate of 285.9 per 100,000 population (271.3 per 100,000

The phrase "similarly situated" has been adopted for purposes of equal protection
analysis in cases concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, Rostker v.
Goldberg 453 U.S. 57 (198 1) where the U.S. Supreme Court held that men and women
were not similarly situated with respect to registration for purposes of being drafted
for service in the military.
7. This idea is well-documented in M. Fineman, "Implementing Equality: Ideology,
Contradiction and Social Change" [1983] Wis. L. Rev. 789.
8. The phrase "feminization of poverty" has been used by a number of writers; one
example is Pearce, "New Knots or New Nets: Towards a Model of Advocacy to meet
the Needs of Single Parent Heads of Household", prepared for Poor Clients Without
Lawyers: What Can Be Done?, Univ. of Wisconsin Law School, October 1984. Fordata
on the phenomenon of the feminization of poverty, see infra, at 5.
9. See infra, at 37.
10. Statistics Canada, Divorce: Law and the Family in Canada (Ministry of Supply and
Services Canada: 1983) at 59. The divorce rate was 124.2 per 100,000 population in
1968. It "subsequently soared to 148.4 in 1972, 200.6 in 1974, 235.8 in 1976, and 243.4
in 1978": see M. Boyd, "The Social Demography of Divorce in Canada" in K.
Ishwaran, ed., Marriageand Divorce inCanada (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) at 248 and
Table 11.1 at 258. See also Statistics Canada, Health Division, Vital Statistics and
Disease Vol. II: Marriage and Divorce (1982) at Table 1.
6.
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population in Ontario)." This rate of divorce was up by 4.1% from 1981, and
by 9.1% from 1980.2
The escalating divorce rate is not by itself proof of the differential impact of
divorce on husbands and wives. However, the statistics demonstrate a pattern
of divorce leading to this conclusion. The pattern, for example, seems to suggest a peak in the number of divorced persons between age thirty and thirtynine. The figures for Ontario are as follows: 3

Age
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over

Table I
Divorced Persons, 1981
70
3,460
15,395
25,255
23,895
21,270
19,835
18,685
15,670
10,290
7,000
4,075
2,945

As the figures clearly demonstrate, the largest numbers of divorced persons in
1981 were between age thirty and thirty-nine with a significant number also
between age forty and forty-nine.
Although these figures show only the number of divorced persons in
particular age groups in 1981, and not the actual ages of husbands and wifes at
divorce, the above figures are generally consistent with those illustrating the
duration of marriage. The latter figures suggest that the largest number of
I1. See Vital Statistics and Disease, id. at Table 10. It is interesting that the rate in Quebec

was 286.6 per 100,000 population, more than the national rate.

12.

Id. at Table 10. The Ontario figures for 1982 represent a 9.1% increase over 1981, and
the 1981 figure was actually a decrease of 3.4% over 1980.

13. Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada Vol. I: Population, Age, Sex and Marital
Status (Ministry of Supply and Services Canada: 1982) at Table 5-Population by
marital status and sex, showing five-year age groups. The figures also show the number
of divorced persons who are "urban" and who are "rural"; there are no significant
differences, except that the number of divorced persons in the age group 35-39 is
slightly higher than for the age group 30-34 for "rural" persons. The statistics show
a median age for divorced persons of 43.6 years (45.1 years for males and 42.7 years for
females).
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divorces in 1982 occurred between five and nine years of marriage, although
the median duration was 10.1 years in Canada and 10.4 years in Ontario:

4

Table 2
Duration in
years (1982)

Under 1 year
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
1-4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years
9 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
20-24 years
25-29 years
30 and over
n/a
TOTAL
Median duration

Canada

195
1,403
2,586
3,493
4,425

Ontario

44
352
645
991
1,397
11,907

4,766
4,811
4,598
4,327
4,071

3,385
1,579
1,651
1,618
1,613
1,411

22,573
14,569
8,215
5,685
3,633
3,576
83
70,436
10.1 years

7,882
5,055
2,795
2,003
1,256
1,190
34
23,644
10.4 years

These statistics are also generally consistent with those regarding ages at
5
marriage and at divorce:

14. See Vital StatisticsandDisease,supra, note 10 at Table 16-Divorces by Duration of
Marriage and Median Duration of Marriage, Canada and Provinces, 1982.
15. See Vital Statisticsand Disease,supra, note 10 at Table 1.
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Table 3
Mean age at marriage:

1982
1981

Mean age at divorce:

1982
1981

Average duration of
marriage for
divorced persons:

1982
1981

Canada

Ontario

Males 25.2
Females 22.6
Males 25.1
Females 22.4
Males 37.7
Females 35
Males 37.7
Females 35
12.0 years
12.1 years

25
22.4
24.8
22.2
37.8
35.1
37.7
35
12.3 years
12.4 years

Overall, the statistics generally suggest that there are large numbers of
spouses who divorce between ages thirty and thirty-nine after approximately
five to fifteen years of marriage. The significance of this demographic data for
assessing the potential difference of impact on former husbands and wives is
related to a number of other factors. One of the most important is that
in marriages with children, the data on average length of marriage and age of
spouses at divorce suggests that in many cases there will be dependent children
who require ongoing custodial care. The statistics further confirm that in the
majority of cases it is former wives who receive custody of dependent children
on divorce, apparently whether or not it is the wife who is the petitioner in a
6
divorce action:'
Table 4
Custody Awards, 1982

Where husband petitioned:
To husband
To wife
To other person/agency
No custody award
TOTAL
Where wife petitioned:
To husband
To wife
To other person/agency
No custody award
TOTAL

16.

Id. at Table 15.

Dependent Children

6,653
10,050
63
2,058
18,824
3,542
40,414
83
2,478
46,517

Family Law and Social Welfare
Thus, approximately five times as many dependent children were placed in the
custody of former wives as of former husbands in 1982.'1
The 1981 census data also reveal that there were at that time 250,285
single-parent families out of a total of 2,778,970 families in Ontario; that is,
approximately nine percent of all families were single-parent families. Singleparent families statistically are less well-off financially than two-parent
families. For example, single-parent families are more likely to live in rented
housing rather than owned accommodation.' 8 The statistical data also seems
to suggest a correlation between lower income and single-parent families in
Ontario: 9
Table 5: 1980 Family Employment Income
Families

Husband-Wife Families
Total
Percentage

of Total
Without Income
Under S5,000
85,000-87,999
S8,000-49,999
$10,000-811,999
$12,000-$14,999
$15,000-$16,999
817,000-419,999

7,090
97,410
81,235
99,400
99,095
141,165
101,675
169,920

6,400
51,885
44,860
82,050
82,035
116,475
87,160
150,555

53.26%
55%
83%
83%
82.51%
86%
88.6%

According to this table, the proportion of husband-wife families within the
total number of Ontario families increased as the level of family income
17. In a Survey of Child Care Arrangements: Initial Results, 1981 (a supplement to tWe
Economic CharacteristicStatisticsLabourForce Survey: Research Paper No. 31). it was
reported that there were some significant differences in the child care arrangements
adopted for preschool age children, depending on whether they lived in a family with a
working couple or with a single mother. The data showed that thirteen percent of
preschool age children of working couples, by comparison with thirty-five percent of
such children of single mothers, were in day-care centres. The percentages of such
children in nursery schools, or cared for at home, for both groups were similar.
However, while only thirty-three percent ofsuch children of single mothers were cared
for in another private home, fifty-two percent of such children of working couples
were cared for in this way. The average cost per week for the care of such children was
$44.00.
18. 1981 Census of Canada Vol. I, supra, note 13 at Table 4-Census families in private
households by family type, family structure and labour force activity of husband and
wife or lone parent, showing tenure of dwelling and number of children at home, for
Canada and Provinces, 1981.
19. Id. at Table 9A: All census families and husband-wife census families in private households, by number and combination of employment income recipients, showing 1980
family income groups, for Canada and Provinces, 1981.
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increased. Presumably, one can conclude that single-parent families were
correspondingly overrepresented at the lower end of the income levels. This
conclusion seems to be confirmed by data on income source. The data is based
on a total of 2,284,840 economic families in Ontario of which 261,255 or
11.4% were identified as low income families; the data also identified family
composition in relation to income level, as follows:2 0
Table 6

Husband-wife Families
Non-Husband-wife Families
Male Reference Person
With children under 16
With no children under 16
Female Reference Person
With children under 16
With no children under 16

Total

Low
Income

Other

Incidence of
Lov Income

1,992,625
292,215
61,675
21,490
40,160
230,560
121,075
109,485

162,255
99,000
8,420
3,915
4,510
90,580
70,475
20,100

1,830,365
193,215
53,230
17,575
35,655
139,985
50,600
89,385

8.1%
33.9%
13.7%
18.2%
11.2%
39.3%
58.2%
18.4%

As Table 6 makes clear, a single parent family has a greater potential for low
income than a husband-wife family, and the risk of low income is substantially
higher for single parent families with female reference persons than with male
reference persons.
There is also data which shows the number of single-parent families by age
2
group and sex of the parent for Ontario: '
20.

Census of Canada, id. at Table 10A-Economic families in private households by
selected characteristics and 1980 income status for Canada and Provinces, 1981.
21. Census of Canada,id. at Table 15-Sole parent census families in private households
by age of parent, showing sex and marital status, for Canada and Provinces, 1981.
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Table 7

Sole parents
Male parents
Total
Married & Spouse
absent
Divorced
Female parents
Total
Married & Spouse
absent
Divorced

Total

Under
age 35

Age
35-54

55
and over

250,215

71,260

116,890

62,060

42,640

5,890

23,745

13,005

19,340
9,640

4,070
1,045

12,135
7,080

3,135
1,515

207,575

65,370

93,145

49,060

71,410
50,355

31,485
16,345

34,550
30,495

5,375
3,515

As Table 7 shows, the highest number of single parents occurs in the age group
35-54. The data also confirm that women are single parents approximately
five times as often as men, as earlier demonstrated.
The above statistics generally confirm that the escalating divorce rate has
resulted, because of the age at which many people divorce, in a substantial
number of one-parent families with custody of dependent children. They also
indicate that women much more often than men receive custody of dependent
children upon divorce. Since the statistics also seem to confirm that oneparent families are generally less well-off than two-parent families, it seems
that women are more likely than men to be financially insecure as a result of
divorce or marriage breakdown. Moreover, because the trend seems to
indicate a continuing increase in the number of divorces each year, it seems
likely that there will continue to be a disproportionate number of women, by
comparison with men, who are financially disadvantaged as a result of divorce
or marriage breakdown.
It is difficult to link this data directly to that concerning welfare payments.
However, the "gender gap" is nonetheless evident in the data on sole support
parents in Ontario:22

22. Ministry of Community and Social Services, ProgramandResourceSummary, 1983-84
Estimates of Average Monthly Caseload by Category F.B.A. at 00040.
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Table 8
Fathers
Deserted Wives
Divorced Wives
Separated Wives

Actual 82-83

Actual 81-82

Actual 80-81

Actual 79-80

77
19,191
8,245
2,216

N/A
19,228
7,517
1,460

N/A
19,540
7,059
742

N/A
20,009
6,818
144

Moreover, there is a pattern among welfare recipients which is quite similar to
that presented by the data on families in regards to age groupings:2"
Table 9
Category

Dependent Father
Deserted Mother
Divorced Mother
Separated Mother

Age
16-20

Age
21-30

Age
31-40

Age
41-50

Age
51-60

143
8
33

179
7205
1919
1299

588
7636
4215
956

1163
3584
2186
258

1637
1230
582
67

As Table 9 suggests, the largest age group receiving family benefits in Ontario
was that of age 31-40, and this pattern seems to parallel that established by the
statistics on divorce. As well, the welfare statistics confirm that single-parent
families in 1982 represented 31.1% of the total number of beneficiaries
receiving Family Benefits, General Welfare Assistance and Gains-D. 24 It
appears that there has been a change over the past two decades, however, in
the size of family units, with smaller numbers of persons in a family unit more
recently.25 For this reason, the proportion of single-parent family beneficiaries
to total welfare beneficiaries obscures the significant increase in the numbers
of single-parent families receiving welfare assistance. In fact:
[d]isabled persons and sole support parents have been the largest groups of social
assistance recipients for two decades. They now represent almost 80% of the
welfare caseload, compared to about 50% in 1961.26
23.
24.

Ministry of Community and Social Services, Management Information Systems
(March 1983) Quarterly Statistical Bulletin at Table 20.
Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and the Ontario Social Development Council, And The Poor Get Poorer: A Study of Social Welfare Programs In
Ontario, rev'd ed. (September 1983) at Figure 9-Reasons for Dependency on Social
Assistance, 1982. Note that single parents comprise only 17.4% of GWA recipients,
but 41.7% of those receiving FBA and Gains-D (Gains-D is a guaranteed income to
persons who have a long-term disability that severely limits routine activities. See id. at

4).
25.
26.

Id. at 66.
Id.
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All of this statistical data seems to lead to the conclusion that divorce may
often result in poverty for former wives 27 and less frequently for former
husbands; this result seems especially to be linked to the frequency of custody
awards to former wives as well as to other factors. Finally, it appears that a
significant proportion of separated, deserted and divorced wives are increasingly the recipients of social welfare assistance, a further confirmation of
the "feminization of poverty".
II. THE EVOLUTION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES:
TOWARD EQUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE 28
A. The Family Law Context
If it is accepted that one of the consequences of the escalating divorce rate is
the "feminization of poverty", it may be appropriate to try to alleviate such
financial hardships for women through legal intervention. If so, it is essential
to appreciate the historical development of the principles which are presently
utilized in both the family law context and the social welfare context,
particularly as they affect spouses upon divorce or marriage breakdown.
There are a number of differing views about the origin of the family and its
historical development. 29 According to Glendon:
the family in early centuries included a wide circle of people from different
households related by blood ties and bya feeling that they belonged together in a
different way from the way in which they belonged to a neighbourhood, a
community or larger political entity.3"
In the context of early English law, the family was part of the social structure
of feudalism, a system of land ownership which ensured that the wealth and
status derived from land remained intact within the family, passing from one
generation to the next by way of the eldest son. Land was the basis for wealth
and status in feudal society, and the social position of individuals was
27.

Within the total pool of poor families, the proportion of female-headed poor families

increased by 75% from 21.6% to 37.6% in the ten year period 1969-79. "And the poor
get poorer...." The Saturday Star (24 September 1983) 1.
28. Mossman, supra, note 2.
29. See Bridenthal, "The Family: The View From A Room of Her Own", in Rethinking the
Family,supra,note I at 225; Zaretsky, "The Place of the Family in the Vclfare State,"
supra, note 1 at 188; Collier, Rosaldo, Yanagisako, "Is There a Family?: New
Anthropological Views", supra, note 1 at 25.
30. M. A. Glendon, The New Familyand the New Property(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981)
at 13-14.
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therefore dependent on their position within the feudal family structure.-"
According to Olsen:
[]ust as the feudal state was not perceived to be clearly separate from civil society,
the feudal family was not perceived to be separate from the rest of economic life;
there was no dichotomy between the market and the family. The hierarchical
family was an integral part of hierarchical society.32
Glendon and others have asserted, however, that the pattern of the family
changed as the feudal system of societal organization was replaced by
capitalism; as capital increased in importance and displaced land as a form of
wealth, the family became defined more in terms of a husband-wife marriage
bond with dependent children: the modern nuclear family." In the twentieth
century, moreover, it has been suggested that the pattern of the family has
changed again as the nature of wealth has once again altered. In the context of
the modern welfare state, both wealth and status in society seem more
dependent on the income and employment of an individual rather than on the
position of the family in society. The "new property" (jobs and employment)
seems to create its own status for the individual, with a corresponding
reduction in the family's role in defining status for its members. 4
In Glendon's view, the transformation of wealth from land (in feudal
society) to capital (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) to income and
employment (in the modern welfare state) contributed to the increasing
independence of members of the modern nuclear family. Until the twentieth
century, only the husband/father had any independence or individual recognition; neither the wife/mother nor dependent children were recognized as
individual members of the family unit until the late nineteenth century.
According to the common law principles enunciated in the feudal period, the
husband and wife became one on marriage; and the one was the husband."
This principle of the unity of legal personality meant that on marriage a
husband acquired the sole right to manage and control land owned by his wife,
the right to all rents and profits from the land, and the right to grant or
31.

For a brief description of modern beliefs about the development of the market and the
family, see F. E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 at 1513-1528.
32. Id. at 1516.
33.

Glendon, supra, note 30 at 14. The timing of the nuclear family and the reasons for its

development are explored in C. N. Degler, "Women and the Family" in M. Kammen,
ed., The Past Before Us (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 308 at 316-317.
34. Glendon, supra, note 30 at 138 ff.
35. The unity principle usually quoted from Blackstone's Commentaries, appears in the
oldest English law book, the Dialogus de Scaccario, II, c. 18. See M. M. McCaughan,
The Legal Status of Married Women in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 2 ff.
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withhold consent to its disposition. 36 Thus, for all practical purposes, the
husband became the owner of all his wife's property on marriage, and the legal
guardian of their children.
The common law principle of unity of legal personality survived, notwithstanding changes in family patterns, until the enactment of the Married
Women's PropertyActs in England at the end of the nineteenth century, and
the impact of the common law principle could be avoided prior to statutory
reform only by the adoption of a trust settlement enforceable in equity. This
device had certain limitations, however. It was useful only where there was
sufficient wealth to warrant the creation and ongoing management of such an
arrangement. In addition, it did not actually make the wife the owner, but
merely the beneficiary of a trust arrangement in which her husband or other
male relative acted as trustee. 37 The enactment of the Married Women's
PropertyActs represented the culmination of a concerted struggle to achieve
individual property rights for women. Yet, although the 1882 Act in England:
is often held out as a milestone in the march of women to equality .... in reality it
did little more than save wealthy women from the irksome restraints of holding
property through trustees. In fact, men continued to control the property of
women, even if only in the capacity of advisors rather than husbands or trustees,
since women were precluded from acquiring the skills thought to be needed for
of their property, such skills being locked within the
the proper administration
38
male professions.
Thus, both the formal principles of the common law, and the economic
reality even after the later nineteenth century statutory reforms, emphasized
the pre-eminent position of the husband/father as legal "head of the household" within the family. The wife/mother's role of homemaking and child care
generally prevented her in practice from acquiring income or property,
notwithstanding the formal equality accorded in the statutory right to hold
separate property. At the same time, however, the law also enforced an
obligation on the husband/father to provide lifelong financial support for his
wife, and for his children during their infancy. 39 Even when judicial divorce
became possible after 1857 in England, the husband's obligation to support his
wife during marriage was extended so as to ensure continued support for an
36. McCaughan, supra, note 35 at 5 ff.
37. See McCaughan, supra, note 35 at 17-19. See also L. Holcombe, Wires and Property
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1983) at 37 ff.
38. A. Sachs and . H. Wilson, Sexism 'and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978)
at 137.
39. The common law provides that a husband must provide for his wife the necessities of
life. See McCaughan, supra, note 36 at 166.
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innocent wife after divorce." Thus, the principle of a wife's entitlement to lifelong financial support seems to have developed as a corollary to her lack of
entitlement to property, and to her inability to earn a living because of her sexdefined role as homemaker and child care provider within the family.
Since World War II, both in Canada and elsewhere, the major re-examination of the roles of men and women which has taken place has influenced
family life, family law, and society at large.4' In the family law context, the
most dramatic change has occurred in the context of divorce and marriage
breakdown. The Divorce Act of 1968 in Canada created a new ground for
divorce: marriage breakdown. Although a divorce may still be obtained on the
basis of specified matrimonial offences, it is the marriage breakdown ground
which has resulted in the phenomenal increase in the divorce rate after 1968.42
The accelerating rate of divorce, coupled with the need to redefine postmarriage relationships in light of changes in the expectations of men and
women, has led to dramatic legal reforms in many provinces within the last
decade.
Since 1978, for example, all of the common law provinces of Canada have
enacted reform legislation with significant effects on entitlement to property
and support for spouses.43 Under most of these new schemes, certain types of
property may be equally divided between the spouses on marriage breakdown,
regardless of which partner holds legal title, and often subject to certain
40.

See B. Hovius, Family Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 379, note 5. See also Ontario

Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law, Part VI: Support Obligations

(Ministry of the Attorney General, 1975) at 5-9.
41.

There are different views of the relationship between law and social change. For two
interesting examples, see J. Eekelaar, Family Law and SocialPolicy(London: Weiden-

feld and Nicholson, 1978) at 27-34; A. Watson, "Legal Change: Sources of Law and
Legal Culture" (1983) 131 U. of Penn. L.R. 1121; and Gibson, "Public Opinion and

Law: Dicey To Today" in D. Gibson and J. K. Baldwin, Law in a Cynical Society?
Opinion and Law in the 1980's (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 1.
42. Supra, note 13, and Vital Statistics and Disease, supra, note 10 at Table 1. See also
Bill C-47 respecting divorce law reform.
43.

See MatrimonialProperty Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. M-9
Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
MaritalProperty Act, R.S.M. 1978, c. 124.
MaritalProperty Act, R.S.N.B. 1980, c. M.-I.1.
Matrimonial PropertyAct, R.S.N. 1979, c. 32.
Matrimonial PropertyAct, R.S.N.S. 1980, c. 9.
Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
Family Law Reform Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1978, c. 6.
Matrimonial PropertyAct, R.S.S. 1979, c. M-6.1.

In Quebec, Bill 89 also marks the beginning of a reform process in family law for the
civil law tradition in Canada. See generally, A. Bissett-Johnson and W. H. Holland,
MatrimonialProperty Law In Canada (Toronto: Carswell). See now Ontario's Bill
1(1985).

Family Law and Social Welfare

discretionary principles. At the same time, however, the concept of marriage
as creating a lifelong entitlement to support seems to have declined in
importance, or disappeared. In its place, the new legislation frequently
provides that each spouse has responsibility for his or her own financial
support, although one spouse may become entitled to financial support from
the other where there is proof of need and available resources. It is the need of
the individual, however, rather than the status of spouse in the family which
generally provides entitlement under most of the reform legislation.44 Thus it
is said that the new principles concerning property and support create equality
and independence for married partners on divorce;45 certain property of the
family is divided, and then each spouse becomes once more an autonomous
individual responsible for self-support.
These family law principles are illustrative of the liberal approach to legal
problem-solving: legal intervention is restricted to removing legal barriers to
full participation, and economic and other barriers are generally ignored.4 6
The recent family law reform legislation establishes a principle of equality of
spousal entitlement to the division of matrimonial property and then declares
each spouse independent and autonomous for purposes of legal rights and
obligations, especially regarding ongoing financial support. Such an approach,
however, essentially fails to achieve effective equality because male and female
spouses are not similarly situated upon divorce or marriage breakdown,
particularly in relation to access to financial security.
There are a number of explanations for this gender gap. In the first place,
where there are few or no assets from the marriage, a division of property will
provide "equality" but little security for either spouse. Moreover, it is likely
that the former wife will be in a disadvantageous position, relative to her
former husband, to achieve independent financial security. This will be especially true if the marriage was based on the husband-breadwinner/wifehousewife model, because such a wife will have some difficulty entering or reentering the work-force, and even more difficulty in a time of high unemployment. In some circumstances, the former wife may be entitled to "rehabilitative" support while she undertakes retraining for employment, but there may
44. For example, see Ontario's Family Law Reform Act, id., ss. 4, 25, and 18.
45. J. Payne has asserted that the principles of family law in Canada generally espouse a
"neutral rather than a normative" approach to marriage and the family: see Payne,
"The Impact of Family Law on the Economic and Social Well-Being of Families in
Canada with Particular Reference to the Financial Consequences of Marriage Breakdown and Divorce", A Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Draft) at 51.
46. Supra, note 4 and note 5.
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be some limits on the length of time for which such support may be provided. 4
Of course, the older a spouse is at the time of divorce, the more hardship there
may be if these principles are rigorously applied. 4' Even if the former wife is
already employed in the paid work-force at the time of the divorce or marriage
breakdown, she may nonetheless face some financial insecurity because she is
statistically likely to earn a salary which is only two-thirds of that which a male
49
may earn.

Second, the statistical data clearly demonstrate that it is the former wife
who is more likely than her former husband to become the custodial parent of
dependent children, and to live as a single parent.50 The ideas of independence
and equality have all too little meaning in this context, since such a former wife
faces all the problems of entering or re-entering the work-force noted above,
coupled with the need to provide for child care.5' The alternative is to provide
child care personally and become a welfare recipient. Even where a divorce
occurs after children have grown up, a wife who has worked for many years as
homemaker and child care provider faces greater obstacles to becoming selfsufficient, having lived a lifetime of economic dependence with an expectation
that her full-time homemaking would lead to economic security in old age.
The obligation of self-support appears especially harsh for such women
because their failure to participate in the paid labour force often results in a
denial of access to pension entitlement. This situation further contibutes to

47.

In Messier v. Delage (1984) 50 N.R. 16, the Supreme Court of Canada decided by a

4:3 majority to continue a former husband's obligation to pay support to his former
wife approximately five years after the divorce and after she had completed some
"rehabilitative" training but had not yet found work. However, it is evident even in the
reasoning of the majority opinion that the Supreme Court recognized some limits to
such support obligations although they were not actually implemented on the facts
of Messier v. Delage. See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Maintenance on

Divorce, Working Paper No. 12 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 30.
48.

There have been some cases where the principles of equality and independence have
been less rigorously applied where the wife is older and has lived her life as a housewife.
For example, see Zupet v. Zupet (1984) 40 R.F.L. (2d) 286; Leatherdalev. Leatherdale
(1982) 45 N.R. 40, 30 R.F.L. (2d) 225 (S.C.C.); Bregman v. Bregman (1978) 210 O.R.

(2d) 722; 7 R.F.L. (2d) 201 (Ont. H.C.); Silverstein v. Silverstein (1978) 20 O.R. (2d)
185, 1 R.F.L. (2d) 239 (Ont. H.C.).

49.

Ontario Ministry of Labour, Women's Bureau, "Women in the Labour Force 'Basic

50.

Facts' Update" (1982).
Supra, note 16 and Table 5; supra, note 13 and note 20 and Table 7.

51.

See Hunter, "Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on
Women" (1983) 6 Harv. Women's L.J. I; Kitchen, "Women's Dependence" (1984)

1(2) Atkinson Review 11; and Olsen, supra, note 32 at 1530-1535.
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the problem of poverty among elderly women in Canada who rely for
financial security on the basic federal pension.52
The principles of equality and independence which have evolved in the
family law context do not match the reality of women's experiences on divorce
and marriage breakdown. From another perspective, the "equality and
independence" is essentially formal rather than effective, a declaration of
what is legally possible without regard to what is economically feasible. In
order for law to provide for effective equality for former spouses, it is
necessary to take account of the actual economic circumstances and the fact
that former husbands and former wives are not in fact similarly situated. 53 The
"neutral" principles of property division and spousal support in Canadian
family law to date have espoused equality and independence for spouses on
divorce or marriage breakdown, but have not achieved these objectives,
especially for women.
B. The Social Welfare Context
Social welfare programs in Canada are quite recent in origin. Numerous
government programs providing financial and other assistance were established in the last century:5 4 workers' compensation as early as the 1880s,
unemployment insurance in 1940, the federal and Quebec pension plans in
1965, universal hospital insurance in the provinces between 1947 and 1961,
and universal medical care insurance between 1962 and 1971. In addition, the
federal CanadaAssistance Plan of 1966 provides for a federal contribution of
fifty percent of provincial social welfare schemes. There are also federal old
age pensions and numerous income tax deductions, credits, and subsidies.
The federal Working Paperon SocialSecurity in Canada55 in 1973 explained
the existence of programs such as these as a reflection of shared community
support for the values of independence, interdependence, and fairness in the
52.

Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, "Poverty Among Ontario's Older
Women" Social Infopac (1982, No. 4) at 2 and Table 2. See also L. Cohen, Small
Expectations: Societys Betrayalof Older Women (Toronto: McClelland and Stewrt,

53.

1984) at 125 if.
See Fineman, supra,note 7. There are also the practical problems ofenforcing support
orders, and the problem ofdetermining the quantum of support where there are both
first and second families. See Kitchen, supra, note 51.

54.

See Government of Canada, Income Security and SocialServices (1969) and Working
Paperon Social Security in Canada (1973).

55.

Id.
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distribution of resources. According to the Working Paper, Canadians accept
the value of independence and expect to:
meet their own needs through their own efforts, and they expect others to do
their best to do the same. This sturdiness of outlook is not a matter, it should be
said, of sheer selfishness: rather it is a matter of believing that each should
contribute, to the extent he is able, to his own and his family's well-being. 6
Similarly, according to the same document, the value of interdependence
means "that man has a responsibility to his fellow men". 5' Moreover, the
Working Paper asserts that there is no contradiction between the values of
independence and interdependence:
It is simply a matter of working, if you are able, to meet your family's daily
needs, and of saving, to the extent you are able, to meet the contingencies of
life."
It is evident that the explanation of the values of independence and
interdependence obscures the role of the family, and the obligations of
individual family members in relation to these values. The quotation concerning "independence" also seems to assume a male breadwinner working to
support family dependents including a spouse; it does not seem to assume
"equality and independence" during the marriage. The second quotation
similarly assumes that support for family dependents is to be provided by
accumulated savings in times of contingencies. Presumably, deserving persons
are those who conform to this pattern and, if all else fails, they will be entitled
to state support. Although social welfare schemes in the twentieth century
have replaced the family (at least to some extent) as the means of providing
economic security, it is apparent from the Working Paper'sdefinitions that the
exact relation between individuals and the family in terms of responsibility for
economic security remains unclear.
The confusion is partly due to the ambivalence about the provision of
income security in the welfare state. Historically, there has been an effort to
ensure an adequate standard of living for the deserving poor, but this group
has usually been carefully distinguished from others who are the undeserving
poor.5 9 In simplest terms, there was a perceived need to distinguish those who
could not work (deserving) from those who would not (undeserving), and to
ensure that the former were taken care of; the latter were to be maintained, if
necessary, but at only a basic subsistence level. As the quotations from the
Working Papersuggest, however, the classifications of deserving or undeserv56. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
57.

Id. (emphasis added).

58. Id.
59.

The terms were used by Pearce, supra, note 8.
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ing poor were essentially conceptualized in terms of the "male head of a
household", and the deserving poor were those in a family unit with a "male
breadwinner" head while the undeserving poor were those in a family unit
with a "male pauper" head.60 It has been suggested, moreover, that these
categories were used to create two different types of welfare benefits, one
which was more of a "right", often not means-tested, and often work-related;
a "charity", usually means-tested, and available to
and the other which was
61
those unable to work.
Using these two categories, it is evident that social welfare available as
unemployment insurance or workers' compensation, for example, would be
classified as "male breadwinner" benefits while welfare assistance to the
unemployable would be in the "male pauper" category. And since both
categories are really directed, as the quotations from the Working Paperseem
to suggest, to the male head of the household, the position of a female single
parent with dependent children is anomalous at best and at worst hard to
classify. Of course, since she will often have no significant paid work-force
participation, she will usually be found in the "male pauper" category: welfare
assistance which is charitable and means-tested, and which will not be
available if there is evidence that there is a male head of the household (the
"spouse in the house" rule). What is significant is that the introduction of
better social welfare programs in this century has had the effect of creating two
classifications of welfare assistance: the deserving poor who receive workrelated benefits such as unemployment insurance or workers' compensation,
and the undeserving poor who receive welfare because they do not work.
What is also becoming evident is that the deserving poor are more often men
while the undeserving poor are more often women, 62 notwithstanding the
male model originally adopted for each category. Ironically, the result may
sometimes be an inequity between two women who appear to be similarly
situated except for the source of their entitlement; for example, a widow who
receives a pension under Ontario's Workers' Compensation Act (originally
payable to her husband) is entitled to a larger monthly sum than a widow who
receives GWA or FBA Benefits (based on her financial need).6 3 While both
women are widows, the former had a husband in the male breadwinner
category while the latter did not.
This way of looking at social welfare assistance suggests that the position of

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also E. Wilson, Women andthe Welfare State (London: Tavistock Publications,
1977).
63. Supra, note 24 at 50-51 and Figure 8.
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female single parents has not received high priority in policy-making. And
there can be no doubt that the desire to create disincentives for male heads of
households to desert their families or fail to work conscientiously might
support the existence of below poverty-level benefits for such female single
parents and their dependent children. However, the advent of a major societal
change such as is evidenced by the extraordinary increase in the divorce rate
and the actual circumstances of many women on divorce or marriage breakdown suggests that the antiquated conceptual basis underlying social welfare
assistance programs in Canada must now be reformed.
It is also instructive to examine social welfare programs to determine
whether the availability of familial support disentitles an applicant. It is
interesting to note that the programs which are essentially those of the "male
breadwinner" model tend to determine eligibility without regard to the availability of familial support, while those of the "male pauper" model grant
benefits only where no familial support is present. The result is that those who
qualify for "male breadwinner" benefits (predominantly males) may do so
regardless of their family income, while those eligible for "male pauper"
benefits (predominantly female) will qualify only if they affirmatively demonstrate the absence of other familial support. Thus, males are generally treated
as individuals for social welfare purposes, while females are more often
regarded as members of a family unit, and not as individuals. The dichotomy
between individual entitlement and the potential for disentitlement because of
familial relations in our social welfare programs has been called the "familialism-individualism flip-flop":
[T1o the degree that we make social security programmes available to individuals, we guarantee as a society some income security to individuals. Conversely, to the degree that we let eligibility to the social security programmes be
determined by family status, we disentitle individuals from access to social
support on the basis of their family status. This disentitlement is usually justified
by reference to the support function of 'the family'-and with the pious wish
that the state (or government) must not usurp the functions of the family.This
encapsules nicely the basic paradox which underlies any social security policy
that is geared towards families rather than individuals: in the name of protecting
'the family' people are disentitled from public support on the basis of their
family status.6
This dichotomy between individual and family status has a significant
impact on women. In many cases, the social welfare system seems to "presume"
the availability of family support based simply on the married (or formerly
married) status of women, thus denying eligibility to welfare benefits; at the
same time, family law statutes seem to "presume" an obligation for self64. M. Eichler, Families in Canada Today (Toronto: Gage, 1983) at 110.
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support, subject to proof to the contrary. What this means is a significant
difference of philosophy between the two statutory schemes, with social
welfare law focusing on the individual's family unit and family law increasingly focusing on the individual. It is true in most cases that a dependent wife (or
former wife) will be regarded as entitled to welfare after she has been
unsuccessful in a suit for support against her husband (or former husband).
However, the fact that the welfare system starts with a presumption of familial
support while the family law system starts with presumptions of equality and
independence means that the woman will likely experience some delay,
frustration and hardship before the systems "mesh", if they do at all:
As far as the support function of families is concerned, there is widespread
consensus that families not only do support their own, but shoulddo so. What is
often overlooked is that there tends to be a direct opposition between the notion
of the family as a support system and social security programmes: to the degree
that the proper locus of support for an individual is seen to lie within that
6s
individual's family, the individual becomes disentitled from public support.
If the increasing focus in family law on the individual represents Glendon's
"attenuation of family ties", 66 it is arguable that there should be a more
general transfer of responsibility for the financial welfare of dependent family
members from the family unit to society at large, and that this philosophical
shift should be recognized in income maintenance legislation in particular.
Yet, while such a transfer would effect the independence of individuals from
the family unit, it would also result in financial dependence on social
assistance programs of government. Clearly, the "independence" thereby
achieved, especially for women, is more theoretical than real.
The lack of congruence between the principles of family law and income
assistance is partly explained by the difference in their historical development.
The evolution of family patterns and changes in the legal relationships of
family members has occurred over a number of centuries, while the income
assistance principles have been established almost entirely in this century.
Further, the development of each set of principles has occurred separately,
based on somewhat different policy objectives and without overall co-ordination. As well, the principles have been directed to the provision of economic
security in two very different kinds of circumstances: family law principles
have been designed for the division of the property of a marriage, and on the
basis that at least some marriages will have substantial assets for distribution.
65. Id. See also Re Pitts and Directorof Family Benefits Brandi of the Ministry of Community and Social Services (1985) 51 O.R. (2d) 302; and Re Dowlut and Commissioner
of Social Services (1985) 30 A.C.W.S. (2d) 299 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
66. Supra, note 31 at 191.
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The creation of independence for purposes of support is at least theoretically
sound in this context. Income assistance principles, on the other hand, are
more clearly designed for those who are economically disadvantaged, including those whose families experience divorce or marriage breakdown. Yet, the
relatively high rates of divorce and remarriage in Canada have resulted in
many situations where family resources are inadequate to provide for the
needs of all dependent "family" members. It is at this point that clear and coordinated policy directions are needed as to the principles to be used to
accommodate the objectives of both family law and income assistance in order
to reflect more equitably the real circumstances of many (former) wives.
C. Merging Principles
Co-ordinating policy directions is an extremely difficult task where contradictory objectives or ambivalence prevail. In the family breakdown context,
there are, on the one hand, policies which assert equality and independence for
former spouses as their objectives. Such policies suggest that income security
is no longer viewed as the responsibility of family members, but rather as the
individual responsibility of every adult."' On the other hand, for other groups,
the law maintains policies which demand contribution from certain individuals (primarily men) to others (primarily women) solely because of a previous
"familial" relationship.6" Therefore, although family law policies hold out
independence as a goal, there is still considerable psychological and other
loyalty to the notion that "the family" should be economically responsible for
its members. Furthermore, it seems that the extent to which the law adheres to
the goal of independence is closely related to the demand on the "public
purse".
The recent case law illustrates this point. In Webb v. Webb, 69 tile parties,
who had been married some twenty years, entered into a separation agreement
which expressly provided that the support was not variable, irrespective of any
change in circumstances of the parties. Subsequently, the husband applied,
pursuant to section 11(2) of the Divorce Act, to vary the decree nisi which had
incorporated the terms of the agreement. Having decided that the court
indeed had the power to vary the maintenance order, Blair J.A. went on to
consider what change of circumstances the court would judge severe enough
67. See FamilyLaw Reform Act, supra,note 43. Although the section speaks of the obligation of one spouse to support another, the presumption is self-support until need

determines otherwise.
68.

See Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151, Regulation 318 as am., s. 13(1) (b).

69. (1983) 39 R.F.L. (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A.).
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to warrant interference with the terms previously agreed to by the parties. He
held that there were three such situations:
(I) Where the failure to provide maintenance in the agreement is likely to result
in a spouse becoming a public charge, the courts have frequently refused to
be bound by the agreement: Fabian v. Fabian;0
(2) Where inadequate provision is made for children in an agreement the courts
have included proper maintenance for children in the decree nisi holding
that the parents may not bargain away rights of their children to support:
Dal Santo v. Dal Santo;7
(3) Where the absence or inadequacy of a provision for maintenance in an
agreement is unconscionable because of its terms or the circumstances surrounding its execution, courts have provided for appropriate maintenance
in the decree nisi even though the validity' of the contract could not be
inpugned because of fraud, undue influence orany other ground established
in the law of contracts: Deroon v. Deroon."
In summing up, Mr. Justice Blair stated again that a court should interfere
with maintenance terms in a separation agreement only when there has been a
"substantial change in circumstances"."' In conclusion, he held that:
Even where no such change in circumstances is established, courts will refuse to
be bound by an agreement, when exercising theirjurisdiction under section 11(1)
or (2), in a narrow range of cases where public policy is offended if it makes a
spouse a public charge, deprives children or is unconscionable. '"
This "narrow range of cases" was acknowledged and accepted in the subsequent case of Southgate v. Southgate.'What is significant about this line of cases is the apparent threshold which is
established; apparently, the spouse's income level will be permitted to decline,
without interference by the courts, until the individual reaches the danger of
becoming a "public charge", but no further. The justification for the noninterference seems to be the notion of the parties' ability to enter into their
70. (1983) 34 R.F.L. (2d) 313 (Ont. C.A.)
71. (1975) 21 R.F.L. 117 (B.C.C.A.); see also Hansford v. Hansford [1973] 1 O.R. 116,
9 R.F.L. 233, 30 D.L.R. (3d) 392 (H.C.); Malcovitch v. Malcovitch (1978) 21 O.R.
(2d) 449, 7 R.F.L. (2d) 54, 91 D.L.R. (3d) 594 (H.C.); and Mercer v. Mercer(1978),
5 R.F.L. (2d) 224 (Ont. H.C.).
72. (1981) 29 O.R. (2d) 750, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 182 (C.A.); Taylorv. Taylor(1978) 8R.F.L
(2d) 70 (Ont. C.A.); Ross v. Ross [1984] W.D.F.L. 659 (Man. C.A.).
73. (1983) 39 R.F.L. (2d) 113 at 145 (Ont. H.C.).
74. Id. Fora case in which the court was willing to recognize unequal bargaining positions,
see Ross v. Ross andHowe; Ross v. Ross andAysan (1983) 39 R.F.L. (2d) 51 (Man. C.A.).
which held that the wife was subject to intimidation by her husband despite independent advice.
75. (1984) 41 R.F.L. (2d) 246.
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own agreements, presumably because of their equality.7 6 The underlying
assumption is that whatever the nature of the relationship between the parties
during the marriage, they are equal and independent upon separation.
In cases where the parties have not entered into a separation agreement,
equality is achieved through the division of marital property, and independence is achieved through some assessment of the quantum and duration of
support payments necessary to make the spouse self-sufficient within a
reasonable time." An interesting development in this regard is the dissenting
opinion in Messier v. Delage,78 in which Lamer J. suggested that selfsufficiency would be achieved where the spouse was employable as opposed to
employed: at the point where a spouse becomes employable, the former
spouse is no longer responsible for support as the employable spouse is then in
an equal position to any other individual who is unemployed. This dissenting
79
opinion seems to have been subsequently ignored in all but one or two cases.

In Farquarv. Farquar(1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 423, 35 R.F.L. (2nd) 287, [1983] W.D.F.L.
1205, 1 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the discretion
to vary maintenance contrary to the domestic contract should only be exercised in
extraordinary circumstances because the parties have agreed to a final settlement of
their own affairs. The rationale in this and subsequent cases is that the parties
negotiate a contract and such a contract should be viewed as binding subject to the
ordinary common law rules. In Pelech v. Pelech (1985) 45 R.F.L. (2d) 1, a recent
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the court denied an application for
variation brought by an indigent wife even though she would thereby continue as a
charge on the welfare system; however, the wife's application in Pelech was filed more
than 13 years after their marriage had been dissolved, and more than 12 years after
her former husband had paid the last of the support payments required under the
terms of the divorce order. Mr. Justice Lambert reviewed the cases, including Webb
v. Webb, and concluded that the general principle is that separation agreements
should not be varied, and that a variation in circumstances such as the present case
would be the exception and not the rule; he also noted that neither the wife's "impoverished circumstances" nor the "long time that has passed since the maintenance
agreement was carried out" were factors which should modify the principle. In view of
the obiter comments in Webb, however, it seems possible that the length of time may
have affected the application of the principle in this case.
77. See, for example, Lazenby v. Lazenby (1975) 18 R.F.L. 393, [1975] W.W.D. 88, rev'g
15 R.F.L. 343 (B.C.C.A.); Messier v. Delage (1983) 35 R.F.L. (2d) 337, [1983] W.D.F.L.
1346, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 50 N.R. 16 (S.C.C.); Sinclair v. Sinclairand Menheer (1984)
40 R.F.L. (2d) 95 (Man. Q.B.); Jirik v. Jirik (1984) 40 R.F.L. (2d) 79 (B.C.S.C.);
Noble v. Noble (1984) 41 R.F.L. (2d) 316 (B.C.S.C.).
78. Messier, supra, note 47.
79. See Oakley v. Oakley (1984) 40 R.F.L. (2d) 211 (B.C.S.C.). In Messier v. Delage, it
should be noted that the former wife had completed a Master's degree in translating
and was working part-time, although she had earned only $5,000 in the year prior to
the trial. The majority held that, having regard to the wife's needs and the husband's
means, the husband should continue to provide support. There had not been a sufficient change in circumstances to support a variation pursuant to s. 11(2); the wife was
not yet self-supporting. See supra, note 47 at 353.
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The reluctance of the courts to embrace this reasoning can perhaps be
explained by the fact that, should it be accepted, even greater numbers of
women would be eligible to claim income assistance.80
The foregoing cases clearly reflect the principles of only one system of
family law.8' Nevertheless, it is precisely for this reason that they reflect the
true emptiness of the principles they espouse. "Public policy" seems to require
that independence and the "clean break" 82 principle generally apply where a
former spouse's income is anywhere above the subsistence level, but where the
state might be called upon to provide income, familial relations and obligations frequently resume primary importance. This conclusion is applied
rigorously by the income assistance bureaucracy, and seems to have some
support among the judiciary in family law cases. In this way, the family law
principles and the income assistance principles merge and gain consistency.
However, the consistency is not developed on theoretical or ideological
grounds but rather on grounds of convenience. In other words, so long as
women bear the costs of marriage breakdown, 3 the principles of "equality
and independence" have at least formal credibility. However, once the burden
is to be shifted to the "public purse", the costs of sustaining such principles
become too demanding. The suggestion here is not that women are "independent" once they receive state support; obviously there is only a shifting of
dependence from one individual to the collective. The point is to expose the
fact that the bottom line is the demand for money from the public purse and
not an ideological consideration; if the general public is required to pay, our
society cannot afford equality for (former) wives.
Ill.

TOWARD A NEW EQUALITY: DEFINING THE LEGAL UNIT

Thus far this paper has been concerned with demonstrating how the use of
inconsistent principles in family law and social assistance legislation contributes to the "feminization of poverty". In short, the economic costs of an
escalating divorce rate have been and continue to be borne disproportionately
by women. As a result, social policy and its underlying theoretical constructs

The fact that most of these women will not have been employed previously precludes
claims against the unemployment insurance scheme. For statistics regarding the
number of women currently receiving income assistance, see supra, note 79.
81. See tenBroek, "California's Dual system of Family Law: Its Origin, Development
and Present Status" (1964) 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257.
82. See Mossman, supra, note 2; and Atkin, "Spousal Maintenance: A New Philosophy"
(1980-81) 9 N.Z.U.L.R. 336, especially 336-7, quoting Lord Scarman in Minton v.
Minton [1979] A.C. 593.
83. This is so because of structural inequities, such as lower wages, occupational ghettos,
lack of day-care facilities, etc. See supra, note 82.
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must recognize that the almost inevitable consequence of marriage breakdown is economic crisis, at least for many women and dependent children. The
question then, from a theoretical perspective, becomes what base unit best
ensures economic security for the individual members of the now displaced
unit?
Analysis of the current legislation reveals a choice between "the family"
and/or "the individual". In selecting a particular unit for policy purposes,
regard must be had to the goals sought to be achieved. As a beginning, we
suggest three: economic security, equality and consistency. An attempt will be
made here to examine the manner in which these units are currently used and
to evaluate these units in terms of the suggested goals.
A. "The Family" as a Legal Unit
Earlier84 it was suggested that the manner in which the units are used is
inconsistent within the law; in family law it is primarily the individual unit
which is used and in social assistance legislation need is defined in terms of the
family unit. In terms of consistency alone, there is nothing inherently better
about using "the family" or using "the individual" as the basis of policy; it is
the fact that both units are used that creates the inconsistency. Initially, it
would appear that this is not a determining factor; either can be used as long as
only one is. Perhaps, however, the obvious difficulty with using "the family" is
the fact that family law principles are frequently used where the family no
longer exists as a unit; assessing needs of that "family" becomes practically
dysfunctional.
Moreover, a brief review of recent social science research leads to the
conclusion that Canadian society is a "mixed bag" in terms of family
structures or forms. Primarily because of the escalating divorce rate, the
number of single-parent and reconstituted family forms has increased dramatically. 5 In addition to these forms there are also: traditional families;
cohabiting spouses which occur as initial families or as second families
following divorce or separation, and which may or may not include children;
and homosexual families. The variety of family forms becomes significant,
taking into account the fact that choosing to use "the family" as the base unit
will necessitate some definition of "the family". The need to find an inclusive
definition for the variety of family forms in the modern context is, to say the
least, challenging.
As family forms have changed, sociologists and anthropologists have also
become increasingly involved with this problem of definition. At a practical
84.

See supra, note 83.

85. See statistics, supra, note 20.
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level, it is increasingly common to characterize family units in terms of their
function. As one group of authors note,8 6 anthropologists have a view of the
family as a universal institution "which maps the 'function' of the 'nurturance' onto a collectivity of specific persons (presumably 'nuclear relations')
associated with specific spaces ('the home') and specific affective bonds
('love')..."" These writers suggest that such a definition may not be applicable
to tribal and primitive societies, but that those who espouse such a definition:
were correct in insisting that the family in the modern sense-a unit bounded
biologically as well as legally defined, associated with property, self-sufficiency,
with effects and a space 'inside' the home-is something that emerges not in
Stone Age caves but in complex state governed social forms .... 88
Yet this means that the functional approach to the family leads only to a
definition which "fits" those forms which have already been recognized and
shaped by state policies. As a result, these writers suggest that to really
understand "families", as opposed to "the family", it is necessary to analyze
the family as an "ideological unit"; 89 it is then possible to see that this unit
makes a "moral statement" and that it has a "dialectical process which
transforms it".9
In this context, it is important to note that any legal definition of "the
family" will have practical ramifications. It is clear that legal definitions of
family both recognize and shape family forms; they are not value-free. What
must be recognized is that any social or legal policy "implicitly orexplicitly...
discourages some reactions among citizens and encourages others ....11This
means that any legal policy which is designed to achieve equality between
family forms in an ideal world must be neutral. However, Sussman argues "no
single policy, legislative act, or program will be equally supportive ofall types
of family structures ...."92 and therefore it would be necessary to adopt
"families" rather than "the family" as the unit. It is suggested that such a
proposition is exceedingly problematic, if not impossible, in the legislative
context.
As stated earlier, existing family law seems to have adopted equality and
Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako, supra, note 29.
Supra, note 28.
Supra, note 30.
Supra, note 33.
Supra, note 36.
Blehar, "Families and Public Policy" in Skolnick and Skolnick, eds., Families in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983) at 604.
92. Sussman, "Family Systems in the 1970's: Analysis, Policies, and Programs" in
Skolnick and Skolnick, eds., Intimacy, Family & Society (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1974) at 582.
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independence as its goals and thereby also assumes "the individual" as the
base unit. However, although this is true with respect to the provisions
regarding support between former spouses, division of property, and support
of children of the marriage, it is also true that these and other provisions are
placed very much within a context of "the family". In the current legislation
the ideal family seems to be the nuclear family. Given the variety of family
forms, as well as the cultural mix evident in current Canadian society,
however, it is no longer tenable to legislate in favour of only one family type.
Firstly, it must be recognized, for the reasons outlined above, that those
families which do not meet the ideal are penalized. Secondly, the ideal is not
composed of form alone. By this it is meant that the ideal vision of "the
family" carries with it an "ideological stance concerning the proper division of
labour within the family".9 3 This division is the traditional male-breadwinner/
female-housewife model and clearly condones a sexist assignment of roles.
This ideological stance not only prescribes particular personal role interactions but also prescribes particular economic responsibilities, and both are
based upon a sexist bias.
Moreover, the "ideal" and the "ideological stance" pervade the social
assistance legislation. Perhaps particularly because of the assumption of the
family as the base unit, the economic responsibilities have a blatant sexist bias;
the role of economic provider is presumed to be male. The damaging
consequence of this is that the economic security of many women and children
is dependent upon a claimant's ability to demonstrate affirmatively that she
lacks a male provider.94 In its worst form, the policy requires that the female
claimant have no sexual relations with a male while receiving social assistance.9 5 One of the assumptions underlying this policy is that women receive
economic security from men as a reward for performing certain services; they
93. Schorr and Moen, "The Single-Parent and Public Policy" in Families in Transition,
supra, note 91 at 177.
94.
95.

See supra, note 65, and accompanying text.
See G.W.A. Policy Manual, 21 July 1980, Ministry of Community and Social

Services, GW-0303-08, at 2: "The following criteria can identify acceptable proof
that an individual is not living as a single person: Familial, Sexual, Social, Economic,
Other. The examples of each (provided below) do not cover all factors that might be
used singly or collectively in assessing whether a person is 'not living in the circumstances of a single peron' or 'living with another person as husband and wife'. They

do, however, suggest a broad range of characteristics which will assist in the making of
sound decisions in these cases....
If the administrator has what he feels is sufficient evidence that a common-law
union exists, then he may refuse or cancel assistance, unless the common-law husband

is eligible for assistance as the head of the family....

More particularly, [s]elf-admission of an ongoing sexual relationshipis also acceptable." (Emphasis added). See also p. 4.
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are the "supported class". 96 Another assumption is that all members of the
family unit benefit where there is one source of income; that there are unified
interests. The latter view is of course applied universally as though the
members of every family interact in the same manner. In addition, such a view
ignores power imbalances which exist between family members. The policy
does underscore, however, that the difficulty experienced by single-parent
families headed by women is "'not the lack of a male presence but the lack of a
male income"."
In sum, the ideal family form which pervades both systems of family law is
not neutral, and in a social climate of diverse family forms, it is prejudicial. In
addition, it threatens both the goal of equality and the goal of economic
security. Inequality results as a consequence of the use of an ideal family form
in a number of different ways. First, adherence to an ideal family form
necessarily creates inequality between variant family forms. Second, the
choice of the nuclear family as the ideal perpetuates inequality between the
sexes. The combination of these inequities is particularly detrimental to the
economic security of female individuals upon the dissolution of marriage.
Moreover, because the nuclear family is the ideal, certain family forms, such as
single-parent families, experience more severe economic insecurity. 9 Third,
since families are dynamic and any ideological unit has a "dialetical process
which transforms it",99 any attempt to formulate policy on the family unit
base is destined to be out of tune with the experience of at least some
Canadian families. Finally, it must not be forgotten that,
[fiamily law both reflects and helps create an ideology of the family-a structure
of images and understandings of family life. This ideology serves to deny and
disguise the ways that families illegitimately dominate people and fail to serve
human wants. .09
B. An Alternative: "The Individual" as a Legal Unit
At first glance, the use of the individual as the base unit for legal policy
seems to overcome many of the disadvantages which accompany the use of the
family. If the individual is used, legal policy can accommodate the variety of
family forms and the cultural differences. As a result, there is no need to define
"the ideal family", and to define all policies in accordance with it.
96. Land, "Women: Supporters or Supported?" in Barker and Allen, eds., Sexual Divisions
and Society: Process and Change (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1976).
97. Cherlin and Furstenberg, Jr., "The -American Family in the Year 2000" The Futurist
(June 1983) 8.
98.

See statistics in Cherlin, id.

99. See supra, note 90.
100. Olsen, "The Politics of Family Law" (1984) 2(1) Law and Inequality 3.
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Family law deals with marriage breakdown and therefore with a particular
family's dissolution. Just as a molecular structure which is disturbed by some
chemical reaction breaks down into individual atoms which may or may not
reorganize themselves into new structures, any family, regardless of the form
of its original structure, is essentially composed of individuals and will break
down into individuals, who may or may not reconstitute themselves in a new
family form. Whereas chemistry uses the atom as its basic unit of analysis,
family law could use the individual. By using the individual, it would be
possible to approach interactions between people and family forms as processes rather than as static entities.
In terms of the suggested goal of equality, the use of "the individual" could
eliminate inequities between family types. In addition, as there would be no
prescribed family ideal, both men and women could interact without prescribed roles based on gender as defined by the ideal nuclear family. In terms
of economic security, responsibilities would be distributed according to needs
and capabilities. The social assistance legislation would incorporate the
individual model and thus provide assistance to those individuals in need. All
of this paints a rosy picture of the use of the benefits of using "the individual"
as the unit. However, experience with its use demonstrates that there are some
difficulties.
Along with the development of no-fault divorce has developed an assumption of a partnership and concurrently an assumption of equality. The result is
that alimony is based on need, child support has become a shared responsibility,' 0 1 and marital property is divided equally. As previously mentioned,
however, the difficulty with the legislation is that sexual equality is stated as an
accomplished fact.'0 2 As another writer has suggested' 0 3 this may be because
there is confusion as to the meaning of equality; does it mean equality of
opportunity or of result? In our current legislation, family members are
"judicially equal". 0 4 Yet, as has been suggested:
This view treats women's subordination as though it occurred by chance. That
men happen to earn almost twice as much as women, and that this affects the
social relations between the sexes is, according to this view, not the state's
concern. Similarly, that children are economically dependent upon their parents
and that parents sometimes use this dependence to dominate or exploit their
101. Weitzman and Dixon, "The Transformation of Legal Marriage Through No-Fault

Divorce" in Families in Transition, supra, note 91 at 363.
102. Weitzman and Dixon, supra, note 100 at 364.
103. Westerberg Prager, "Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law" in Rethinking
the Family, supra, note 1at I 11.
104. Olsen, supra, note 102.
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children, is likewise not the state's concern. Rather, the mistreatment 03
of wives
and children is simply a series of unfortunate individual occurrences.
Moreover, a consequence of the atomization process is the non-recognition
of interdependence, as the quotation at the beginning of this paper illustrates.
And because interdependence is not recognized, the value of home labour is
not fully recognized. This result interferes with the goal of equality between
the sexes and has attendant economic consequences for the division of
property. The individual unit also fails to take into account that people often
make certain life choices, for example career choices, because of spousal and
family considerations, choices that they wouldn't necessarily make if they
were not members of a family unit. More often than not, it is women who
make sacrifices in their career advancement opportunities, either because they
take on the child care role or because the man's earning power is greater and it
makes more economic sense. In this context, if Glendon's assertions are
correct and the new (valuable) property is employment status and entitlements' 06 therefrom, an equal division of marital property does not in fact
accomplish the goal of equality. Using the individual as the base unit does not
solve all the problems.
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER QUESTING
In sum, the goal of equality is not necessarily better served by using "the
individual" as opposed to "the family" as the unit. However, thepoientialfor
serving that end is perhaps greater. It is clear that using "the individual" as the
base unit would create much greater economic security for individuals in
terms of the social assistance legislation, particularly for the increasing
numbers of single-parent families headed by women. This fact, in addition to
the fact that the goal of consistency would be accomplished if the individual
were to be used in the social assistance legislation as in family law, may be a
persuasive reason for reforming social assistance legislation.
The point here is that a major societal phenomenon has created a need for
policy-making which does not simply tinker with the existing principles, but
which recognizes the feminization of poverty resulting from liberalized
divorce laws, and which takes into account the variety of family forms. It may
be that legal policy-making should abandon both the concept of "family" and
of "the individual" in this context, and adopt an entirely different unit, such as
that now used by Statistics Canada." 7 This paper, which does not itself offer a

105. Id. at 10-11.
106. See supra, note 30.
107. For example, the concept of the "household".
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solution, is intended to explore the dimensions of the problem, the nature of
the policy implications, and the need to recognize the inherent (sex) inequality
of family members which actually exists and which is indeed fostered by the
"neutral" principles of existing family law. As a former wife said in relation to
a potential support order:
Whenever there is money involved, the relationship never really ends. As far as
the father seeing the kids is concerned, I don't mind at all. But I don't want any
money involved, because it becomes a matter of control. We all know that those
who have money control!'o

108. Ng, "The Politics of Ontario's Family Law Reform Act" (1980) 2(4) Can. Women's
Studies 88 (emphasis added).

